News and Events

A special lecture presented by the NMSU Philosophy Department

Knowledge How

and Intelligent Action

Marc A. Moffett

Philosophy Department

University of Wyoming

& John Bengson, ANU/University of Wisconsin

In this paper we explore the following "Kantian" question: How is intelligent action possible? Our goal is to provide a certain kind of intellectualist answer. In the first part, we will develop a framework for understanding this question in a relatively precise way. In the second part, we provide an account based on our theory of knowledge how which accounts for

intelligent action in terms of the nature of an individual's grasp of relevant concepts.

                 Date:    Thurs, 4/7/11

              Time:    4:00 pm

              Place:   Breland Hall 172

A special lecture presented by the NMSU Philosophy Department

How much human enhancement

is too much?

Prof. Nicholas Agar

Philosophy Department

Victoria University of Wellington

New Zealand

Those who aspire to radical enhancement seek not just to improve significant attributes and abilities, but to boost them to levels that greatly exceed what is currently possible for human beings.  This talk investigates the moral and prudential limits on human enhancement.  I present enhancement as one among many influences directed at human beings that may be acceptable if practiced in moderation, but is wrong if taken to extremes.  There is an upper limit on the degree of enhancement that it is good for a human being to undergo, an upper limit that radical enhancement would take us beyond.

                      Date:    Thurs, 1/13/11

                      Time:    4:00 pm

Place:   Breland Hall 172

NMSU Philosophy Alumnus Recognized:

NMSU Philosophy Department

presents a special lecture

Two Lost Souls

Prof. Debra Nails

Michigan State University

Plato develops two powerful models of the human psyche (a.k.a. soul):  a unified one and a tripartite one.  The two are, however, incompatible with one another in that they have very different implications for how we ought to live.  Sigmund Freud cites Plato’s dialogue Symposium for his own influential views on psychoanalysis; but certain of Freud’s later additions to his theories closely resemble Plato’s second model of the psyche, the tripartite one developed primarily in the dialogue Republic.  The talk considers both Plato’s models and argues for the superiority of the Symposium version.

                           Date:    Tuesday, March 9

                           Time:   3:00 pm

                           Place:   SH 116

The Philosophy Department, NMSU

special lecture

An Anarchist Argument for Political

Obligation

presented by

Prof. John Harris

Philosophy Department

Texas Christian University

Do we have a moral obligation to obey the law?  According to philosophical anarchists we do not.  Over the past thirty years anarchy has enjoyed something of a resurgence, and this is in large part due to the fact that some of the classic theories offered in defense of a moral duty to obey the law have been found to have significant weaknesses.  Without any obvious alternative justifications available, anarchists argue that we should accept the conclusion that we are not morally bound to obey the law.  Of course, anarchists must explain how it is that there will not be chaos if a society were to accept their position. Anarchists offer two strong responses to this concern.  First, anarchists argue that morality itself is sufficient to guide our behavior, and thus the law is unnecessary.  Second, we have a moral duty to obey the law when the law serves to solve coordination problems.  I argue that the first response is inadequate, and the second opens the door to develop an anarchist theory of political obligation.

 Date:    Thursday, October 29

                         Time:    4:00 pm

                         Place:    Guthrie 101

Philosophy Talk

Professor Elisabeth Gedge from McMaster University will present her paper, "Reproductive Choice and the Ideals of Parenting", October. 15 at 4 pm in GU 101.



Reproductive Choice and the Ideals of Parenting

The expressivist argument against prenatal genetic diagnosis for disability (PGD) maintains that PGD constitutes an affront to persons with disabilities (Parens and Asch, 2000). When expressivism targets individual reproductive choice it is often judged implausible because reproductive choice is typically motivated by personal circumstances rather than political sentiments. However, in “Where is the sin in synecdoche?” (2005) Asch and Wasserman make a persuasive case for criticizing the individual choice to use PGD to determine disability.
Although Asch and Wasserman’s argument supports the moral objection at the heart of expressivism, its valorizing of unconditional maternal love and its emphasis on the distinctiveness of the parental relationship is at odds with some important lines of feminist ethical reasoning. I explore the tension between Asch and Wasserman’s account of the ideals of parenting and feminist theoretical unease with the moral exclusivity of the reproductive role.

Philosophy Talk

Dr. Mark Walker

Dept. of Philosophy NMSU

Sept. 16th, 4:30 in BC 106

Playing Doctor: why the uninsured ought to be permitted to self-medicate

Approximately one in six persons in the U.S. lack medical insurance. Legislation permits only physicians to prescribe many common medicines. This state of affairs is unjust. A just society cannot have it both ways: legislation cannot say that the expertise of physicians is so precious that only they can prescribe medicine AND not everyone is guaranteed reasonable access to their services. If there is no guarantee of reasonable access then physicians should not have a monopoly on writing prescriptions, and if there is a monopoly on writing prescriptions then people should have reasonable access to their services. To remedy this situation we must ensure that all citizens have reasonable access to medical services, or allow the uninsured to self-medicate.

In the years since 9/11, discussion of torture in the United States has revolved around a single question: Wouldn't you do it to find out where the ticking bomb is planted?  I will argue that this is exactly the wrong question to ask, and that the made-for-TV ticking bomb hypothetical has a destructive effect on public discussion.  In the course of the paper, I touch on several other topics:  why torture tops the list of evils; why, in the words of philosopher Henry Shue, "artificial cases make bad ethics"; what the limits of moral rationality are; and why it is morally corrupting to "think the unthinkable."

A central question in recent moral and political philosophy has been whether well-off people have moral duties to help those lacking basic necessities, and if so how extensive these duties are. The very existence of such “positive” duties to render aid is controversial, and even those who concede their existence worry about how far-reaching these duties are. By contrast, no one denies that people have duties not to harm others. A central feature thought to distinguish negative from positive duties is how demanding they are: in general duties not to harm seem easy to fulfill, while duties to aid seem onerous. I argue that the contrast in burdensomeness between negative and positive duties may once have been sharp but—in the increasingly common cases of what I call the New Harms—no longer is. The last part of the paper
draws some practical conclusions about how to make seemingly demanding duties less onerous, and calls into question the very basis of the distinction between negative and positive duties.

Announcement:

Endowed chair to help Department of Philosophy develop master’s program in ethics

After more than 40 years as an engineer, Richard L. Hedden wanted to learn more about the humanities. So he left Los Angeles, moved to Las Cruces, and enrolled at New Mexico State University, signing up for classes in anthropology, history, astronomy, criminal justice, and lately, philosophy.

Hedden thanked the university for his education by leaving a generous financial gift establishing the Richard L. Hedden Endowed Chair in Advanced Philosophical Studies. The endowment will be funded by an initial gift from Hedden with the provision that additional gifts may be made at any time.

The fund will allow the Department of Philosophy to develop a flagship master’s program in ethics and applied ethics by enhancing the annual salary of a new faculty member in the department, providing a graduate assistantship stipend to the department, and providing income for a Philosophy Speaker Series, said Tim Cleveland, academic head of philosophy.

“There’s not really a program like this in the state or region,” Cleveland said. “Richard’s generosity is a huge shot in the arm for us and an incredible show of faith in the department, beyond our wildest expectations.

“We will be poised to make a unique contribution to education in the Southwest. This gift will allow us to hire a new person with a reputation in ethics who can come in here and help us get an applied masters program in ethics off the ground,” Cleveland said, noting that three of the four tenure-track faculty members in philosophy specialize in ethics and applied ethics.

Hedden said he would like the university to offer mandatory classes in citizenship. And he said Plato was probably right when he said, “Don’t study philosophy until you’re 30 years old.”

“If more working adults did this, the whole society would improve,” Hedden said.

By his generous gift that will allow NMSU to offer more advanced ethics classes, Hedden is helping to improve society, too, Cleveland said.

“Teaching ethics courses helps develop in students the critical reflection necessary to be highly effective members of society. It gives them the resources to better handle the difficult moral dilemmas they will face in science, business, agriculture, or life in general,” he said. “The enhanced program in philosophy and ethics made possible by Richard’s generous gift will help produce more ethically sensitive and reflective citizens for New Mexico and will make a distinct contribution to philosophy in the state.”

Bob Nosbisch Aug. 21, 2007

 

Announcement:

Philosophy Alumni and Faculty Endowed Scholarship

The Philosophy Department awards an annual scholarship of approximately $500 to a Philosophy major who will be either a junior or a senior in the upcoming academic year.  Interested parties should submit a letter of application to the Philosophy Department containing content relevant to the following categories:

    * Your name
    * Current GPA
    * Philosophical interests
    * Philosophical ambitions
    * Philosophy courses taken, including the grades you received for each course
    * Perhaps other courses related to philosophy that you have taken, including the grades
    * Philosophical papers that you have presented (if any)
    * Philosophical publications (if any)
    * Membership in any philosophical organizations, including any leadership positions
    * An argument illustrating why you deserve to be a recipient of this scholarship

A polished, philosophical writing sample will also be welcomed as an optional supplement to your letter of application.

All entries must be submitted to the Philosophy Department by 5:00 pm on April 30.

The Philosophy Department hopes to award the scholarship by the end of this semester.

 

 

Events:

 

Guest Lecturer: Prof. Mark Walker, McMaster University

Date: Thursday, March 6, 2008

Time: 4:00 pm

Place: Hardman Hall, Room 208, NMSU campus

Designer Babies

ABSTRACT: Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) refers to procedures to test genetically embryos in vitro. One means to create "designer babies" is to produce several embryos in the lab and then use PGD to select a candidate (or candidates) for implantation. Those embryos not selected for implantation are typically destroyed or cryogenically preserved. Presently, PGD is used mainly for 'negative selection'. Increasingly, PGD may be employed for 'positive selection,' e.g., it has been used to select embryos for tissue matching to save an elder sibling, and for gender selection. In the near term, there is the distinct possibility that it could be used to select for genes associated with the potential for increased muscle mass, perfect pitch, or high IQ. This paper argues that even if we grant the (contested) claim that embryos are persons, positive selection does not harm the persons created through this process. That is, this paper has the counterintuitive conclusion that a policy that permits positive selection cannot be said to harm those persons created, even if it is foreseeable that tens of thousands of persons will be killed through the process.

 

Guest Lecturer: Prof. Neil Delaney, Visiting Ryan Chair of Metaphysics and Morals, Georgetown University

Date: Tuesday, February 26, 2008

Time: 4:30 pm

Place: Hardman Hall, Room 208, NMSU campus

Love's Contours

ABSTRACT: This talk offers a substantial romantic ideal for modern Westerners, and makes explicit both the psychological needs people commonly expect romantic love to service and the robust yet conditional commitment it demands. The basic ideas are the following: people regularly want to form an intimate union with another, to be loved for properties of certain sorts, and to have this love generate and sustain a distinctive sort of commitment to them. I close with a detailed account of what I term a "loving commitment."

 

 

Guest Lecturer: Prof. John Symons, Philosophy Department, University of Texas-El Paso

Date: Tuesday, December 3, 2007

Time: 4:30 pm

Place: Hardman Hall, Room 208, NMSU campus

Pain and Embodiment

ABSTRACT: What is the relationship between our bodies and our pains? Many philosophers have argued that there is something ontologically special about qualitative experience and that pains do not necessarily have anything to do with bodies.  Such arguments move from claiming that we have special epistemic access to qualia to the ontological claim that qualitative states are non-physical.  Specifically, Saul Kripke argued that because we know the essence of pain and because we can conceive of disembodied agents who suffer pain there is no way to identify pain with any physical state.  This talk examines both components of Kripke’s argument and challenges the identification of my pains with the pains of possible non-physical agents.  The talk concludes by rejecting the identification of embodied pains with stipulated pains.